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Company’s political connections got concerned in recent years, the political 
connection of “key executives” can bring policy benefits such as tax incentives and 
the convenience of financing to firms, which is helpful to improve business 
performance. Referring to some related literatures, this paper tries to extend the 
executives limits, which used to define the political connection of company, from 
“key executives”(such as the actual controller, chairman, president or CEO) to 
professional managers, discussing the connection between the political connections of 
professional managers and firm performance in private family business. For depth 
research, this paper introduced government intervention and legal protection to study 
how professional managers using their political connections. On the other hand, this 
paper introduced family firm style(include nuclear family firms, and extended or 
composited family firms) to study the effects of using professional managers’ political 
connections in different family firm styles. 
Using 922 samples of Chinese private family business during 2004 to 2010 listed 
in SMEs and GEM, we find some meaningful conclusions. Firstly, this paper studies 
the relationship between political connections of professional managers and firm 
performance, the result shows that the political connections of professional managers 
are quite helpful to improve firm performance. Secondly, while introducing 
institutional environment variables into our study, the result indicates that in province 
which having more government intervention or less legal protection, professional 
managers are eager to use their political connections to improve firm performance. 
Lastly, while introducing family firm style into our study, the result shows that the 
firm performance benefits more from the political connections of professional 
managers in nuclear family firms, otherwise the firm performance benefits less from 
the political connections of professional managers in extended or composited family 
firms. Furthermore, while the extended family members have position in TMT, the 
professional managers get more trouble in using their political connections to improve 














managers in private family firms is helpful to improve firm performance with the 
same to the political connections of “key executives”, but having different behavior 
patterns. In addition, our study also shows that the political connections is also 
affected by the family firm styles, which inform us that the factors from family 
members should be take into consideration while study the political connections of 
professional managers. 
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et al.（2007）[6]、Boubakri et al.（2008）[5]等认为公司的政治联系其实是一种“政
府干预”，通过干预决策过程导致公司管理者目标混乱（Shleifer and Vishny，1994）
[7]，过多的政府干预也导致对公司管理者的监督和激励不充分（Vickers and 
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1.2  相关概念的界定 





的临界控制权比例有 10%、20%、30%和 40%（La Porta et al，1998[23]；Claessens 
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